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We measure the extent to which skilled immigrants increase innovation in the United States by exploring
individual patenting behavior as well as state-level determinants of patenting. The 2003 National Survey
of College Graduates shows that immigrants patent at double the native rate, and that this is entirely
accounted for by their disproportionately holding degrees in science and engineering. These data imply
that  a one percentage point rise in the share of immigrant college graduates in the population increases
patents per capita by 6%. This could be an overestimate of immigration's benefit if immigrant inventors
crowd out native inventors, or an underestimate if immigrants have positive spill-overs on inventors.
Using a 1950-2000 state panel, we show that natives are not crowded out by immigrants, and that immigrants
do have positive spill-overs, resulting in an increase in patents per capita of about 15% in response
to a one percentage point increase in immigrant college graduates. We isolate the causal effect by instrumenting
the change in the share of skilled immigrants in a state with the initial share of immigrant high school
dropouts from Europe, China and India. In both data sets, the positive impacts of immigrant post-college
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mgauthie@princeton.eduEconomists have studied the impact of immigration on a variety of host country out-
comes. For example, Card (2007) considers U.S. immigration's impact on population
growth, skill composition, internal migration, wages, rents, taxes and the ethnic and
income composition of neighborhoods and schools. In contrast, the impact of immigra-
tion on innovation has received less attention. In addition to the direct contributions of
immigrants to research, immigration could boost innovation indirectly through positive
spill{overs on fellow researchers, the achievement of critical mass in specialized research
areas, and the provision of complementary skills such as management and entrepreneur-
ship. Some tantalizing facts hint at the possible importance of these eects for the United
States. Compared to a foreign{born population of 12% in 2000, 26% of U.S.{based Nobel
Prize recipients from 1990{2000 were immigrants (Peri 2007), as were 25% of founders of
public venture{backed U.S. companies in 1990{2005 (Anderson and Platzer 2006), and
founders of 25% of new high{tech companies with more than one million dollars in sales
in 2006 (Wadhwa et al. 2007). Immigrants are over{represented among members of the
National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering, among authors
of highly{cited science and engineering journal articles, and among founders of bio{tech
companies undergoing IPOs (Stephan and Levin 2001). Kerr (2007) documents the surge
in the share of U.S. patents awarded to U.S.{based inventors with Chinese and Indian
names to 12% of the total by 2004, and Wadhwa et al. (2007) nd that non{U.S. citizens
account for 24% of international patent applications from the United States.
The goal of our paper is to assess the impact of skilled immigration on innovation
as measured by U.S. patents. The purpose of studying patents is to gain insight into
technological progress, a driver of productivity growth and ultimately economic growth.
If immigrants increase patents per capita, they may increase output per capita and make
natives better o. This is an important consideration for the debate concerning how many
and what type of immigrants should be admitted to the United States, and particularly
for the discussion of the appropriate number of employer{sponsored H{1B visas for skilled
(especially science and engineering) workers. The context of the discussion is the shift from
European to low and middle{income source countries since the Immigration Act of 1965,
1and the concomitant faster increase in unskilled immigration than skilled immigration.
The share of skilled immigrants that are scientists and engineers will clearly be an
important determinant of the impact of skilled immigration on patenting. We therefore
begin by examining theoretically the conditions under which foreigners with science and
engineering education are more likely to move to the United States than other skilled
foreigners. We then use the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG) to ex-
amine whether immigrants patent more than natives because they have higher ability or
merely more science and engineering education, and to gauge the impact of immigrants on
patents per capita under the assumption that immigrants do not inuence the behavior
of natives or other immigrants.
In order to account for immigrants' possible inuence on natives or other immigrants,
we turn to a panel of U.S. states from 1950{2000, based on data from the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Oce, the decennial censuses and other sources. We test whether skilled
immigrants crowd out skilled natives from the states (and occupations) to which they
move, and we provide estimates of skilled immigrants' impact on patents per capita that
encompass both immigrants' own patenting and any positive spill{overs immigrants might
have. To obtain the causal eect of immigrants despite their endogenous choice of des-
tination state, we dierence the data across census years, and instrument the change in
the share of skilled immigrants in a state with the state's initial share of immigrant high
school dropouts from Europe, China and India, the origin regions of at least 40% of skilled
immigrants throughout the period.
We contribute to two understudied areas, the impact of immigration on innovation
and the individual determinants of innovation, as well as to the study of the regional
determinants of innovation. Our work is also relevant for the macroeconomic growth
literature, where the link between innovation and the number of researchers is the key to
growth.1
We go beyond the most closely related paper linking immigration and innovation, Peri
(2007), by adding individual{level analysis, extending the state panel, using instrumental
1Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b), Jones (1995), Romer (1990).
2variables, dening skilled immigration consistently across time and more broadly, and
testing for crowd{out of natives. These considerations also distinguish our paper from
the time{series analysis of Chellaraj, Maskus and Mattoo (2008). Both of these papers
nd skilled immigration increases U.S. patenting. Our analysis is more general than
that of Stuen, Mobarak and Maskus (2007), who nd that immigrant students increase
U.S. university patenting and science and engineering publishing. A related paper by
Niebuhr (2006) concludes that German regions with more diverse worker nationalities
(as measured by the Herndahl index) patent more. The result is not robust to region
xed eects, however, no doubt in part because she has only two years of data close
in time (1997 and 1999). Paserman (2008) nds no eect of skilled immigration on
Israeli manufacturing productivity. We are not aware of previous papers with regression
analysis of the individual determinants of patenting, though Morgan, Kruytbosch and
Kannankutty (2003) note in passing the immigrant advantage in patenting in the 1995
NSCG, and economic historians have studied the characteristics of nineteenth century
inventors (e.g. Khan and Sokolo 1993).
There is a large literature on the regional determinants of patenting, but the analysis
relies primarily on cross{section variation or qualitative analysis. The literature considers
the eects of private and public R&D spending, the presence of a university, the presence of
small rms, the competitiveness of product markets, the presence of an airport, geographic
centrality, population density and size and the presence of skilled workers, especially
scientists and engineers.2 The most closely related paper (other than those by Peri and
Niebuhr) is by Zucker and Darby (2006): they pool data on Bureau of Economic Analysis
regions for 1981{2004, and nd that non{university patenting is aected by neither the
presence of star scientists, a high wage (proxying for education) nor a high stock of relevant
journal publications (representing the stock of knowledge).3
2See, for example, Acs (2002), Bottazzi and Peri (2003), Hicks et al. (2001), and the papers in Acs et
al. (2002); Jae, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) and successor papers study geographic patterns of
patent citations.
3Other relevant papers include Agrawal, Kapur and McHale (2002), who nd that emigration from
India reduces access to knowledge in India, Zucker et al. (2006), who examine the determinants of
3Our theoretical analysis shows that workers with science and engineering education are
more likely to emigrate than other (\professional") skilled workers if the expected wage
premium commanded by professional over unskilled jobs in the destination is smaller
than the cost of adapting professional skills to the destination institutions. Our empirical
analysis of the NSCG data shows that immigrants account for 24% of patents, twice their
share in the population, and that the skilled immigrant patenting advantage over skilled
natives is entirely accounted for by immigrants' disproportionately holding degrees in
science and engineering elds. The data imply that a one percentage point increase in
college{graduate immigrants' share of the population increases patents per capita by 6%.
This could overestimate the contribution of immigrants, if immigrants crowd out na-
tives, but using the panel of states we show this does not happen. This is consistent with
Borjas (2006), who nds that immigrants do not crowd out natives as a whole from grad-
uate school. Instead, the state panel data show evidence of positive spill{overs of natives,
since the estimates of the immigrant impact on patents per capita are higher than in the
NSCG: a one percentage point rise in the share of immigrant college graduates in the
population increases patents per capita by about 15%. The state{level results mean that
the 1990{2000 increase in the population share of this group from 2.2% to 3.5% increased
patents per capita by about 20%. Consistent with the individual{level analysis, we nd
that immigrants have more than double the impact on innovation that natives do. We
nd that immigrants who are scientists and engineers or who have post{college education
boost patents per capita more than immigrant college graduates.
1 Theory
The share of skilled immigrants with science and engineering education will clearly be an
important determinant of the impact of skilled immigration on patenting. It is likely that
scientists and engineers are over{represented among migrants, since scientic and engi-
a region's publications in nanotechnology, and Marx, Strumsky and Fleming (2007) and Stuart and
Sorenson (2003), who examine the eect of a state's enforcing non{compete laws on inventor inter{rm
mobility and biotech IPOs respectively.
4neering knowledge transfers easily across countries: it does not rely on institutional or
cultural knowledge, is not associated with occupations with strict licensing requirements
like medicine, and does not require the sophisticated language skills of a eld like law.
Chiswick and Taengnoi (2007) show immigrants work in less language{intensive occupa-
tions than natives. In this section, we show under what conditions foreign scientists and
engineers are more likely to choose to migrate to the United States than other skilled
foreigners.
Immigration to the United States does not depend only upon the choices of poten-
tial immigrants, of course. U.S. employers and universities, for example, inuence the
allocation of visas. Also, scientists and engineers might be common among immigrants
because market conditions in the sending countries lead a larger share of foreigners than
Americans to study science and engineering. Nevertheless, it is likely that self{selection
is in part responsible for the fact that skilled immigrants of all visa types are more likely
than skilled natives to have studied science and engineering (as shown by the NSCG).
We consider a world with two countries, the origin o and the potential destination
d, and three types of labor Lk: scientic labor Ls, professional labor Lp and unskilled
labor Lu. We assume that wages for each type of labor are higher in country d, so that
immigration goes in one direction only: wd
k > wo
k for all k. The migration cost is Md
with a distribution g(Md) on [Md
L;Md
H]. The cost may vary for an individual for many
reasons such as relatives in the destination country, number of children, language skills,
adaptation capacity, etc.
Consider the decision of an origin worker to emigrate. If she chooses to stay in the
origin country, a worker of skill category k will receive a real net wage wo
k with certainty.
Workers of all three skill categories can nd an unskilled job with certainty if they move
to country d, but professional migrants can only nd a professional job in country d with
probability P d
pp, and scientic migrants can only nd a scientic job with probability P d
ss
(and scientic workers cannot work as professionals and vice{versa). Moreover, while
scientic knowledge is equivalent in the two countries, a professional migrant needs to
adapt her skills at cost Cd
p > 0 in order to get a professional job in country d. Thus,
5P d
pp = 0 unless the worker adapts her skills.
We assume workers are risk neutral, have perfect access to credit, care only about
consumption, and therefore maximize the expected present value of lifetime income. The
expected wage of an worker in the origin country is
E[wjk] = P(emigrate to d)[E(w
djk) M
djemigrate to d]+(1 P(emigrate to d))w
o
k; (1)
where P(emigrate to d) is the probability of migration. Assuming that the worker prefers












Thus, the worker will emigrate to country d with probability G( d
k). The expected gain

















































































Productive skill premium at home
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Innovative skill premium at home
:
6We assume that the cost of acquiring professional and scientic skills is the same, and
that the expected benets must therefore be the same. If this were not the case, workers
in the origin country would all choose the more protable skill category. This would
decrease the marginal value of labor of this category, and thus its wage, until equality was





















































> 0 (strict inequality if
 d
k > Id
L), we have that  d
s   d
p is of opposite sign from wo
s  wo
p. We can use this to show
that, under some conditions, we must have  d
s >  d
p i.e. a greater return to migration for
scientic than professional workers.
Proposition 1. If wd
u < wo






































Proof. See the Appendix.
Focusing on the simpler sucient condition, we see that for an origin country whose
scientic workers earn more at home than unskilled workers in the destination, scientic
workers have a larger expected gain from migration than professional workers if the skill
adaptation costs for professional migrants are larger than the expected professional skill
premium in the destination. Therefore, scientic workers are more likely to migrate than
professional workers. No correspondingly simple condition exists for the case of wd
u > wo
s,
4For the proof, see the Appendix.
7where unskilled workers in the destination earn more than scientic workers in the origin
country.5
2 Empirical methodology
We use individual{level data to measure and explain dierences in patenting behavior
between immigrants and natives, and to gauge the contribution of immigrants to patenting
per capita under the assumption that immigrants do not aect the behavior of natives
or other immigrants. We then use state{level data to test for crowding out of natives by
immigrants, and to estimate the eect of immigrants on patenting per capita, including
any positive spill{overs.
2.1 Individual{level data
A measure of the increase in patenting per capita owing to skilled immigrants can be
calculated as follows. Let the skilled immigrant share of patents be 0 (we obtain this
value from the NSCG) and the skilled immigrant share of the population be 1 (we
obtain this value from the census). Let MS be the number of skilled immigrants and
P MS their patents. If the skilled immigrant share of the population increases by one





percent increase in the population is MS
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We shall establish below that skilled immigrants patent more than skilled natives,
and that this dierence is driven by the dierence in patenting at all. For policy{makers
contemplating reducing skilled immigration and inducing more natives to study science
5In principle, we can maximize discounted lifetime income of workers in the origin country, taking
the migration option into account and assuming a distribution of the cost of skilled education relative to
unskilled education, and calculate the share of workers at each skill level, for migrants and non{migrants.
In practice, the resulting non{linear equations cannot be solved analytically.
8and engineering, it may be interesting to understand the reasons for the immigrant ad-
vantage. To explore these reasons, we estimate a probit for the probability of having a
patent granted, or the probability of commercializing or licensing a patent, weighted by
the survey weights:
P(patentj) = 0 + 1IMj + Xj2 + j; (9)
where j indexes individuals and IM is a dummy for the foreign{born. The coecient
of interest is 1. We are interested in how much of the raw patenting gap between
immigrants and natives (the value of 1 with no X covariates) can be explained by adding
the covariates X: eld of study of the highest degree, the highest degree, and demographic
variables. We perform the regressions for three samples: college graduates, post{college
degree holders, and scientists and engineers.
2.2 State{level data
We supplement the analysis using a panel of U.S. states with decennial data from 1950{
2000. By extending the period of observation back to 1950, we are able to distinguish
long run and short run eects by dierencing the data in lengths varying from ten to 50
years.6 We do not extend the data to prior decades as patenting in the years of the Great
Depression and the Second World War was probably atypical.
In order to obtain an estimate of the impact of immigrants on innovation that encom-








it + Xit3 + 4Zi;1950 + t + it; (10)
where i indexes states, P is the number of patents, POP is state population, IS is
the share of the population or workforce (18{65) composed of skilled immigrants, NS
is the corresponding share for natives, Zi;1950 are characteristics of the state in 1950, X
are contemporaneous state characteristics and t are year dummies. The coecient of
interest is 1, though its size relative to 2 is also of interest. We also present results from
specications where the dependent variable is not in logs.
6Strictly speaking, we should refer to low{frequency and high{frequency eects.
9We dene a skilled person variously as one with a college degree or more, one with post{
college education, or one working in a science, engineering or computer science occupation.
We include characteristics of the state in 1950 (including land area), as the other covariates
do not appear to capture the convergence in patents per capita occurring over the time
period. The X covariates comprise the log of defense procurement spending and the log of
the average age of state residents (18{65). We deliberately do not include R&D spending,
as we believe this to instead be a potential outcome variable. We lead the dependent
variable by one year to allow for a year of research time between the change in the inputs
and the patent application, as anecdotal evidence suggests the lag can vary between a few
months and two years.
There were several major changes to the patent system between 1980 and 1998 (see
Hall 2005). One change led to a large increase in patenting in electrical engineering
relative to other elds. To capture potentially dierential eects of this by state, we
include among the X's the share of employment in electrical engineering{related elds in
1980, interacted with year dummies.7 We use state populations to weight the regressions,8
since in some small states one company drives the time series of patenting,9 and we cluster
standard errors by state to allow for serial correlation.
Because we account for state xed eects by estimating equations dierenced across
time, we elect not to include the change in the patent stock among the regressors as would
be suggested by patent models. Furthermore, because we analyze long{run changes, we
have chosen not to use a partial adjustment model.10
Equation (10) suers from an endogeneity problem. Skilled workers are likely to
migrate to states which are growing or innovating, causing ^ 1 and ^ 2 to be biased upward
7We use 1980 values as electrical engineering employment was still tiny in most states in 1950{1970.
8Specically, we weight by 1=(1=popi;t+1 + 1=popi;t k+1), where k is the length of the dierence.
9Idaho's emergence as the state with most patents per capita has been driven by one semi{conductor
company, Micron Technology Inc., founded in 1978, which was granted 1643 patents in 2001 and was the
fourth{ranked company in this regard.
10We have estimated these models. The coecient on the change in the stock of patents is close to
one, rendering all other coecients insignicant, while the coecient on the partial adjustment term is
insignicant.
10in least squares estimation. On the other hand, ^ 1 in particular could be biased towards
zero owing to measurement error.11 We use several sets of instruments to address these
problems for skilled immigrants. To instrument IS = IS
t   IS
t k, we use IHSD
t k , the
share of the population that is an immigrant high school dropout at time t   k, and
its square. The presence of immigrant high school dropouts in a state will mean the
existence of cultural amenities attractive also to skilled immigrants. On the other hand,
high school dropouts should play a minimal role in innovation, justifying their exclusion
from equation (10). A (preferred) variant of this instrument set is three variables for the
share of high school dropouts at t   k who were born in Europe, China and India, the
most common source regions for skilled immigrants. Alternatively, we use the values of
the variables at time t   k   10 as instruments so as to be more condent that they are
unaected by unobserved factors inuencing the change in patenting between t   k and
t.12
We also use the state panel to test for crowd{out of natives, which if present would
bias upward the impacts calculated using both the individual{level and state{level data.
Natives may choose not to enter careers in science and engineering, or to work less, or to
avoid certain states, owing to competition from immigrants whose comparative advantage
is in less language{intensive and less institution{specic occupations. Any drop in native
inventors must be taken into account when calculating the net benet of immigrants. We
test for crowd{out using the approach of Card (2005) by running the regression
Sit = 0 + 1I
S
it + 2Ageit + t + it; (11)
where S is the share of the population or workforce (aged 18{65) composed of skilled
natives and immigrants, IS is again the share of skilled immigrants, and Age is the
average age of the state's population between 18 and 65. We control for the average age
11There is considerable measurement error for small states in the 1950 census, which was a smaller
sample than later years and which asked certain key questions of only one quarter of the sample. There
may also be measurement error for the share of immigrant scientists and engineers in all years.
12For NS (native skilled workers), we have experimented unsuccessfully with lagged college enroll-
ments as an instrument. The enrollment data only begin in the 1970s in any case.
11of the state since birth cohort is the strongest determinant of schooling. If increases in
the skilled immigrant share translate into one for one increases in the total skilled share,
there is no crowd{out and ^ 1 = 1. Complete crowd{out would be represented by ^ 1 = 0,
while ^ 1 > 1 would indicate that skilled natives were attracted to states with many skilled
immigrants. Measurement error could cause ^ 1 to be biased towards zero.
It seems reasonable to think that the change in the share of less skilled immigrants
would aect the share of the population that is skilled. We therefore do not use the
instrumental variables described above which are based on shares of unskilled immigrants
(the instruments would be correlated with the error term), but rather extend the covariates
to include the change in the share of the population which is foreign{born with a high{
school degree or less.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Individual{level data
We use the individual{level data from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates
(NSCG). These data are a stratied random sample of people reporting having a bachelor's
degree or higher on the long form of the 2000 census. In 2003, all respondents who had
ever worked were asked whether they had applied for a U.S. patent since October 1998,
whether they had been granted any U.S. patent since October 1998, and if so, how many,
and how many had been commercialized or licensed.13 The survey will not capture patents
by those with less than a college degree, but we assume that most patents are captured.
The Data Appendix provides more information on the NSCG. We include in our sample
respondents 65 or younger (the youngest respondent is 23, but few are younger than 26).
Immigrants are those born outside the United States.
We dene three (not mutually exclusive) skill categories, motivated in part by con-
13Questions on patents were also asked in the 1995 NSCG, but only of respondents who said they
worked in research and development in the survey week, which will cause the patents of job changers to
be missed.
12sistency with categories that can be distinguished in the censuses: college graduates (i.e.
the full sample); holders of a post{college degree; and those working as scientists and
engineers in the survey week. Only 51% of respondents who had been granted a patent
reported working in a science or engineering occupation. Another 18% reported a man-
agement occupation: a research team's manager is sometimes listed as a co{inventor on
a patent, and all inventors listed are captured in the data, and many inventors will have
been promoted to management since obtaining a patent. Science and engineering tech-
nicians represent 2.5% of patent holders, and respondents in health{related occupations
represent another 3.0%.
Table 1 shows details of how patenting varies by immigrant status for the three skill
groups. For college graduates (the whole sample, columns 1{2), 1.8% of immigrants were
granted patents compared to 0.9% of natives, a ratio of 2.0, and patents per capita were
0.054 for immigrants and 0.028 for natives, a ratio of 1.9. Immigrants therefore patent
at about twice the native rate, with the dierence being principally in the probability of
patenting at all. Immigrants held a slightly smaller advantage in patents commercialized
or licensed, patents likely to benet society more than others: 1.1% immigrants had
commercialized a patent compared to 0.6% for natives, and commercialized patents per
capita were 0.027 for immigrants and 0.017 for natives. The immigrant{native gap is
larger for the sample with post{college education (columns 3{4), but much smaller for
the sample working in science and engineering occupations (columns 5{6). For example,
6.1% immigrants in the latter sample had been granted a patent, compared to 4.9%
natives, and immigrants hold 1.32 times the patents per capita of natives. Appendix
Table 1 contains the means of variables used in the regression analysis below.
3.2 State{level data
The patent data used in the state{level analysis come from the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Oce (USPTO). Patents are attributed to states based on the home address of the rst
inventor on the patent. We merge a series based on electronic data from 1963 onwards
13with a series from paper records for 1883{1976 (see the Data Appendix for the merging
procedure). Patents are classied according to application (ling) date. Figure 1 shows
the evolution of total patents and patents per 100,000 residents from 1951-2001, our
principal study period.
In Figure 2 we use patent data from 1929 to 2001 to display the long{run convergence
across states in patenting, as measured by changes in the (unweighted) standard deviation
of log patents. The convergence in patents, shown by the downward slope of the top line, is
not merely a function of convergence in population, as is demonstrated by the convergence
in patents per capita (bottom line). However, there is divergence in patents per capita
from 1990{2001, and there have historically been other periods of divergence. California
is a force for divergence, as may be seen by the growing gap between the inequality of
state patent counts (top line) and the inequality of counts without California (middle
line).14
We have also used an extract from the Harvard Business School patent data le,
which contains information on patents granted from 1975 to 2007, arranged by year of
application and patent class.15 We have aggregated the patent classes to six categories
using the classication of Hall, Jae and Trajtenberg (2001) and our own classication of
patent classes created since 1999. The extract contains the number of citations made to
patents in each patent class, state and application year. These may be viewed as a proxy
for the quality of the patent. We analyze 1971{2001 data using this extract (see the Data
Appendix for how we approximate 1971 values).
To compute the shares of the population in various education and occupation classes,
to divide these into immigrant and native, to calculate the average age of the state's
population and to obtain weekly wages, we use the IPUMS microdata of the decen-
nial censuses. We base most calculations on the population or workforce aged 18{65.
Post{college education is the highest education level that can be measured consistently
throughout 1950{2000. We dene immigrants to be the foreign born. Information for
14Papers such as Co et al. (2006) have previously noted cross{state convergence in patents per capita.
15We are very grateful to Bill Kerr for making this extract for us.
14Alaska and Hawaii is not available in 1950.
The variable means for the full 1950{2000 sample, weighted by population, are re-
ported in Table 2. Between 1950 and 2000, the share of the population 18{65 composed
of immigrants with college education or more increased eightfold to 3.5%, while the equiv-
alent share for post{college increased eightfold to 1.6%. The population shares comprising
natives with at least college and with post{college increased from 6.2% to 20.0% and from
2.3% to 7.7% respectively. The share of workers composed of immigrant scientists and
engineers multiplied ninefold to 0.9%, while the native share rose from 1.2% to 3.5%. The
Appendix Table 2 contains the means of the variables used as instruments.
4 Results
4.1 Individual determinants of patenting
The NSCG data may be used to estimate the direct eect of immigration on patenting,
ignoring possible crowd{out or spill{over eects, using (8). Immigrants hold 24.2% of
patents in the (weighted) data (0 = 0:242), and in the 2000 census (the basis of the
NSCG sampling frame), college{graduate immigrants were 3.5% of the U.S. population
(1 = 0:035). A one percentage point rise in the share of college immigrants in the
population therefore implies an increase in patents per capita of 0.061, or 6.1%. The same
exercise may be performed for natives, with the result that a one percentage point rise in
the share of college natives increases patents per capita by 3.5%. As immigrants with post{
college education have 2.0 (=0.108/0.054) times as many patents per capita as immigrants
with only a college degree (see Table 1), the direct impact of an extra percentage point
of post{college immigrants in the population is likely to be 2.0 times higher, or an extra
2:06:1 = 12:2%. Similarly, the contribution of an additional percentage point immigrant
scientists and engineers is likely to be 3:2  6:1 = 19:5%.
To assess the reasons for the immigrant patenting superiority, we rst observe that
in Table 1 immigrants' patenting advantage over natives is much smaller in the scientist
and engineer sample (columns 5 and 6) than in the overall sample (columns 1 and 2).
15This suggests that immigrants' advantage is due in large part to a greater science and
engineering orientation. Table 3 lends further support to this. Column 1 shows that, for
the whole sample, 6.6% of those with a highest degree in physical science and 6.0% of those
with a highest degree in engineering had patented, far ahead of other elds. Column 2
shows a qualitatively similar picture for commercialized or licensed patents. Immigrants'
education is therefore well{suited to patenting, since columns 3 and 4 show that the share
of immigrants with physical science and engineering degrees is more than twice as high
as for natives.
In Table 4, we pursue this explanation with the aid of a probit for the probability of
patenting. Column 1 shows that immigrants are 0.9 percentage points more likely to have
been granted a patent in the sample of college graduates (top panel), 2.1 percentage points
more likely in the sample of post{college educated (second panel) and 1.2 percentage
points more likely in the sample of scientists and engineers (third panel). In the second
column, we control for 30 dummies for the eld of study of the highest degree obtained
by the respondent. For all three samples, the gap becomes small and insignicant (5{
7% of the original size for college and post{college graduates). In the third column,
we control for the highest degree obtained by the respondent. For college graduates and
scientists and engineers, the direction of the gap is reversed: immigrants are a statistically
signicant 0.9{1.0 percentage points less likely to patent than natives. Controlling for
age, age squared, sex and current employment status in column 4 changes little. Skilled
immigrants' advantage is therefore entirely due to the nature of their education, and not
to any selection on unobservables such as ability.16 In columns 5 and 6 we show that
the same conclusions may be drawn for the probability of commercializing or licensing a
patent.
16It is possible that unobservable eects cancel out e.g. immigrants may have higher ability but lower
quality education.
164.2 Crowd{out
To test for crowd{out, we estimate equation (11). The results with college or more as an
indicator of skill are reported in Panel A of Table 5. Column 1 shows that with weighted
least squares and ten{year dierences, a one percentage point increase in the share of the
population that is immigrant college graduates only increases the overall share of college
graduates by 0.51 percentage points. This indicates crowd{out, though the coecient
is not statistically signicantly dierent from one. As we increase the length of the
dierences, evidence of crowd{out disappears: the coecient is 0.75 for 30{year dierences
in column 2, and 0.95 for 50{year dierences in column 3. In columns 4{6, we report the
corresponding results after controlling for the change in the share of the population which
is foreign{born with a high{school diploma or less. This addition increases the coecient
on the change in skilled immigration to 0.79 for ten{year dierences (column 4), and
to 1.2 for 30 and 50{year dierences (columns 5 and 6), with none of the coecients
signicantly dierent from one. The specications of columns 4{6 are preferred to those
of columns 1{3, so the preferred point estimates indicate at most about 20% crowd{out.
In panel B, we repeat the regressions using post{college education as the measure
of skill. The coecients in all columns are signicantly greater than one, suggesting
that skilled natives are attracted to states (or education levels) with many immigrants.
In panel C, we repeat the regressions using the share of workers who are scientists and
engineers. The coecients indicate no (columns 1 and 3{6) or little (column 2) crowd{out,
with none of the point estimates signicantly dierent from one.
We have repeated all the regressions including dummies for seven BEA regions and the
results change little, except that the coecient when skill is measured by a college degree
falls back to 0.55 for ten{year dierences (the coecient is 0.92 for the unreported 20{year
dierences). In summary, with the exception of one coecient, there is no evidence of
crowd{out, and for post{graduates it appears that natives attract immigrants.
174.3 State determinants of patenting
In Table 6, we estimate the state determinants of patenting using dierences of dierent
lengths, with a college degree as the measure of skill. In columns 1{4 the dependent
variable is the log of patents per capita. The coecients on the share of immigrant
college graduates are positive and signicant. In columns 1{3, where we use weighted
least squares, a one percentage point increase in the share of the population composed
of immigrant college graduates is associated with an 11{12% increase in patenting for
ten and 30 year dierences, and a 15.6 log point (17%) increase for 50 year dierences.
These eects are larger than the 6% impact calculated based on the NSCG data, implying
positive spill{over eects of immigrants.
In column 4, we present the results of instrumenting the ten{year change in skilled
immigrant share with the share of European, Chinese and Indian high{school dropouts
at t   10 (the initial year of the pair of years dierenced). The coecient on the change
in the immigrant share is a statistically signicant 17.7, and larger than its least squares
counterpart of 11.4 in column 1 (though not statistically signicantly so). This may
indicate that in least squares, measurement error's bias towards zero is more important
than upward bias due to the endogenous location choice of immigrants, a possibility
mooted by Card and DiNardo (2000) in a similar context. Another possibility is that the
instrumental variables estimators place more weight on later years of the sample when
the eects seem to be higher. It seems less likely that skilled immigrants whose behavior
is aected by the instrument (skilled immigrants whose location decision is aected by
the presence of other immigrants) are more inventive than other immigrants. We do
not present instrumental variables estimates for longer dierences for this or most later
specications: results are generally similar for 20{year dierences, whereas for 30{50 year
dierences the instruments are not strong in the rst stage.
In columns 5{7 the dependent variable is simply the change in patents per capita (in
these columns the coecients are multiplied by 100). The least squares eects for ten and
50{year dierences are similar: a one percentage point increase in the skilled immigrant
18share is associated with a 0.000039 increase in patents per capita, which is a 17% increase
compared to the mean. The corresponding impact for the unreported 30{year dierences
is 13%, so the results are similar to those of the log specication in columns 1{3. The
instrumental variables coecient in column 7 is larger than its least squares counterpart
in column 5, but insignicant. The skilled immigrant coecients in columns 5{7 are not
very sensitive to the covariates included, while the results in columns 1{4 are much smaller
if the 1950 covariates (and land area) are not included.
By contrast, most of the coecients on the change in the share of native college grad-
uates are small and insignicant. The point estimate increases as the dierence length
increases, and for 50{year dierences the coecient is a signicant 6.7 in column 3 (about
half the immigrant eect, as in the NSCG). As the share of native college graduates
changes only gradually (i.e. at low frequency), the absence of signicance at short dier-
ences probably reects the emphasis of short dierences on high{frequency events (Baker,
Benjamin and Stanger 1999). The coecient suggests that skilled natives too have posi-
tive spill{overs, as the eect of a one percentage point increase in their population share
based on the NSCG data was 3.5%.
Older populations appear to be more innovative, as indicated by the positive coe-
cients on the average age of the state in the log specications of columns 1{4. This may
reect the importance of management or other skills complementary to innovation. As
suggested by time series work in Griliches (1990), Department of Defense procurement
spending lowers patenting in the log specications, presumably in part because military
invention is primarily protected by secrecy rather than patents. Finally, the importance
of the 1950 conditions (and land area) increases with the dierence length.
These regressions are repeated in Table 7 with post{college education (panel A) and
a science and engineering occupation (panel B) as measures of skill. The least squares
coecients for immigrant post{college range from 17{27 in columns 1{3, where the de-
pendent variable is in logs. These estimates are almost twice as high as for immigrant
college graduates in Table 6, consistent with the NSCG data. The ten{year dierence
instrumental variables coecient in column 4 is higher, at 38.1, but statistically insignif-
19icant. The coecients in columns 5{6 are insignicant, but are also about double their
counterparts in Table 6. The instrumental variables coecient in column 7 is larger than
its least squares counterpart in column 5, but also insignicant. The coecients on the
share of native post{college educated are never statistically signicant, though the point
estimates are higher for the longer dierences. The immigrant/native ratio at 50{year
dierences is 2.8{3.3, compared to 3.0 in the NSCG.
In panel B, the coecients are signicant in all columns for immigrants and most
columns for natives, and are larger than for the other skill groups. For immigrants in
columns 1{3, a one percentage point increase raises patents by 48{59 log points, or 62{
80%. Unlike for college graduates and post{college educated, the instrumental variables
estimates (columns 4 and 7) are fairly similar to the least squares estimates (columns 1
and 5). The coecients are high compared with the direct NSCG eect of about 19.5%
and compared with that of natives at 50{year dierences (29 log points), given that in the
NSCG the immigrant patenting advantage over natives was only 32% amongst scientists
and engineers. However, the discrepancy is smaller in the specication we present below
as our preferred specication.
We have repeated all the least squares regressions of Tables 6 and 7, splitting the
skilled natives according to whether they lived in the state of their birth or not (these
results are not reported). For short dierences, the coecients on the change in the share
of both skilled native groups are small, for all three skill measures. As the dierence
length increases, it is the coecient on the change in the share of skilled natives born in
another state that increases.
In Table 8 we present various alternative estimates of the eects of skilled immigrants,
concentrating on the college{educated and the scientists and engineers, on ten-year dif-
ferences, and on the log specication (results without logs display similar patterns). We
report only the coecient on the change in the skilled immigrant share, each from a dier-
ent regression. In the rst row, we reproduce the baseline least squares and instrumental
variables results from Tables 6 and 7. In the next three rows, we vary the instruments
used. In the second row we use as instruments the shares of the population composed of
20European, Chinese and Indian high school dropouts at t   20, instead of at t   10 as in
the baseline. The resulting coecients are slightly larger than the baseline instrumental
variables coecients, which in turn were higher than the least squares results. In rows 3
and 4, we use as instruments the share of all foreign{born high school dropouts and its
square, at t   10, and at t   20. With these instruments, the point estimates are quite
similar to the baseline least squares results for college graduates, but for scientists and
engineers are slightly higher than the baseline instrumental variables results.
In the next two rows we experiment with adding covariates. In row 5 we allow for
(seven) BEA{region specic trends in patents per capita. This reduces the coecients to
68{84% of the magnitudes of the baseline row and renders them statistically insignicant,
though the least squares coecients are signicant at the 10% level. In row 6, we add
instead the interactions of the 1980 share of employment in electrical engineering{related
sectors interacted with year dummies. This yields estimates that are also lower than
those in the baseline row, though generally statistically signicant, this time 79{86% of
the baseline magnitudes.
In row 7 we investigate the inuence of California in the baseline specication by
dropping that state. This reduces the estimates greatly. Finally, we assess the robustness
to dropping the 1990{2000 dierences (while retaining California), using the baseline
specication. This causes the weighted least squares coecients to become much smaller
and insignicant, with point estimates of 6.5 and 21.2 in columns 1 and 3. However,
for the college educated, the larger instrumental variables estimate of 12.5 is statistically
signicant in column 2. Instrumental variables point estimates are also much larger than
least squares estimates for scientists and engineers. The sensitivity to the dropping of
the year 2000 is present at all lengths of dierences (these results are not reported). The
coecient on the change in the share of skilled natives, by contrast, is not greatly aected
by the dropping of the year 2000 (these results are also not reported). The inuence of the
year 2000 for immigrants reects either a genuine change in the eect (perhaps caused by
an increase in the quality of skilled immigrants through the expansion of the H{1B cap),
reduced measurement error owing to larger numbers of skilled immigrants in the census,
21or the presence of a confounding factor correlated with increases in skilled immigrants in
the 1990s. The results are not sensitive to the dropping of the 1980{1990 changes (these
results are not reported).
Our preferred specication is the instrumental variables specication of row 6 in Ta-
ble 8, which includes controls for the importance of electrical engineering in the state
economy: instrumental variables estimation is preferred to least squares, the instrument
using specic ethnicities is preferred to the instrument based on the share of all immi-
grant dropouts, and some controls for what is driving the growth in patents in recent
years are desirable. A similar justication could be made for the specication of row 5,
where regional trends are accounted for (and the results are similar to those of row 6).
The preferred specications mean that a one percentage point rise in the share of immi-
grant college graduates increases patenting per capita by 14 log points (15%), the same
rise in the share of immigrant scientists and engineers increases patenting per capita by
45 log points (57%), and the same rise in the share of immigrant post{college educated
increases patenting per capita by 27 log points (31%; this coecient is not reported in
the table). These eects imply large spill{overs, as they are considerably larger than the
impacts calculated with the individual data of 6%, 12% and 19.5% for a one percentage
point increase in immigrant college graduates, post{college graduates and scientists and
engineers respectively.
In Table 9 we investigate further using the Harvard Business School patent data for
1971{2001. We report only the coecient on the change in the skilled immigrant share,
each from a dierent regression, with log patents per capita as the dependent variable.
In the odd columns we use the preferred instrumental variables specication of row 6 in
Table 8, while in the even columns we use the 20{year dierence counterpart, as these
results are more statistically signicant. In row 1, we repeat the row 6 Table 8 regressions
with the reduced number of years available, to serve as a benchmark: the results are
similar. In row 2, we use patent citations, or quality{adjusted patents, instead of patent
counts. The point estimates do fall slightly: immigrants are slightly less benecial than
they appear from the raw patent counts. This is consistent with the NSCG there was a
22slightly lower immigrant patenting advantage for commercialized or licensed patents than
for all patents (see Table 1).
In the remaining rows 3{8, we examine patent counts for six dierent categories of
patent. Splitting patents into categories increases the standard errors considerably, and
most coecients are insignicant. However, the the results do suggest a large impact
of skilled immigrants on computer and communications patents (row 3), and no positive
impact on drug and medical patents (row 5) and \other" patents (row 8).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have combined individual and aggregate data to demonstrate the im-
portant boost to innovation provided by skilled immigration to the United States in
1950{2000. A calculation for 1990{2000 puts the magnitudes of the eects in context.
The 1.3 percentage point increase in the share of the population composed of immigrant
college graduates increased patenting per capita by about 20%.17 The 0.7 percentage
point increase in the share of post{college immigrants increased patenting per capita by
about 21%18, and the 0.45 percentage point increase in immigrant scientists and engi-
neers increased patenting per capita by about 22%.19 These impacts include the positive
spill{overs of skilled immigrants, which are a substantial share of the total impact: calcu-
lations based on individual{level data of the impacts without spill{overs suggest impacts
of about 8{9% for all three skill groups.20 We do not nd evidence that immigrants crowd
out natives from certain occupations or states.
We nd that a college graduate immigrant contributes at least twice as much to
patenting as his or her native counterpart. The dierence is fully explained by the greater
share of immigrants with science and engineering education, implying immigrants are
not innately more able than natives. Indeed, immigrants are less likely to have patented
1714  1:3 = 18:2 log points= 20%.
1827  0:7 = 18:9 log points= 21%.
1945  0:45 = 20:3 log points= 22%.
206:1%  1:3 = 7:9%;12:2%  0:7 = 8:5%;19:5%  0:45 = 8:8%
23recently than observably similar native scientists and engineers. Despite this, the fact
that immigrants increase patenting per capita without reducing native patenting shows
that their presence in the United States provides a previously undocumented benet to
natives, assuming the immigrants would have been less innovative or less able to commer-
cialize their innovation elsewhere or that U.S. natives benet more from innovation and
commercialization in the United States than abroad.
If natives are making optimal career decisions, subsidies to induce them to enter sci-
ence and engineering in greater numbers would not be benecial even if the marginal
native had higher patenting ability than immigrants in science and engineering. Policies
to encourage natives to enter science and engineering are warranted only if they address
obstacles to optimal decision{making, such as a lack of information about available ca-
reers, inadequate primary and secondary education or excessively high discount rates.
The results do not make clear precisely which immigration policies are appropriate to
take advantage of the contributions of immigrants demonstrated in the paper. While
allocating more visas based on whether the applicant has studied science or engineering
may seem appealing, such a policy ignores potential benets of immigrants without a
science or engineering background. Furthermore, admitting scientists and engineers on
work visas should be weighed against an alternative of admitting foreign students to study
science and engineering at U.S. universities.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. If wd
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s. We have that the left side of the equation is
positive, since G() is a density function, so it is increasing. Now, let us look at the right
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Under these conditions, we get a contradiction, since the left side is strictly positive,
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29Data Appendix
B.1 National Survey of College Graduates
The data were collected between October 2003 and August 2004 by the U.S. Bureau of
the Census, on behalf of the National Science Foundation. The data consist of a stratied
random sample of people reporting having a bachelor's degree or higher on the long form
of the (April) 2000 census, who were under age 76 and living in the United States or its
territories including Puerto Rico in the reference week of October 1, 2003. Immigrants
are those born outside the United States. Missing information is imputed with a hot deck
procedure, and imputed values are not agged. More information on the data is provided
at www.nsf.gov/statistics/showsrvy.cfm?srvy CatID=3&srvy Seri=7#fn1. The data are
available at www.nsf.gov/statistics/sestat/.
B.2 Patents
We combine two patent series from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oce. The rst
series was compiled for me by the USPTO based on their electronic records which begin
in 1963. This series is utility patents by state and year of application. Year of application
is preferred to year of grant as it is a more accurate match to the time of invention. The
second series (U.S. Department of Commerce 1977) is from paper{based USPTO records
of patents by state and grant year 1883{1976 (application year is not available pre{1963).
Grants lag applications by a median of three years between 1950 and 1963 (according
to my US{wide calculations based on Lexis{Nexis), so we lead this series three years.
Patents grants are also more volatile than patent applications (Hall 2005), so we smooth
the series with a three year moving average. Finally, because for 1930{1960 plants and
designs cannot be separated from utility patents, we leave them in for the whole series,
calculate by state the average percent gap in the overlap years of the two series (18% on
average), and reduce the old series by this percent. We then merge the series, using the
adjusted paper series values only for pre{1963. The USPTO attributes a patent to a state
according to the home address of the rst{listed inventor.
We have also used an extract from the Harvard Business School patent data le, which
contains information on utility patents granted from 1975 to 2007, arranged by year of
application and patent class. We have aggregated the patent classes to six categories
using the classication in Hall, Jae and Trajtenberg (2001) and our own classication
of patent classes created since 1999. In particular, we attribute classes 506 and 977 to
chemical patents; classes 398, 701{720, 725 and 726 to computers and communication
patents; and classes 901 and 903 to mechanical patents. We have not been able to nd
denitions for some patent classes created in 2006 or later (which aects some patents
applied for in earlier years), and a small number of patents have a missing patent class.
For the application years we used, 0.04% of patents are not allocated to one of our six
categories. To examine patents by category, we have simply attributed 1974 values (most
patents granted in 1975 were applied for in 1974 or earlier) to 1971, then used 1971, 1981,
1991 and 2001 patent values, and 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 values for the dependent
30variables. Some small states do not have patents in every category in every year, and in
the analysis of log patents these observations are missing.
The extract also contains the number of citations made to patents in each patent
class, state and application year. These may be viewed as a proxy for the quality of the
patent. We calculate citations per patent from 1974 onwards for each state. We then run
a regression of this ratio on a trend for each state from 1974{1980, and use the resulting
coecient to predict the 1971 value of citations per patent for each state. We then return
to our original, longer patent series obtained directly from the USPTO, and multiply the
patents by the ratio for 1971 onwards. We can then study citations, or quality{adjusted
patents, for 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001.
B.3 Immigration, education, age, occupation, labor force status
We use extracts from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series for the United States
Census, available at usa.ipums.org/usa/, and aggregate to the state level using the weights
provided. Variables computed as shares (other than the excluded instruments) are com-
puted as shares of the population or workers aged 18{65, and average population age is
the average age of people aged 18{65. Immigrants are people born outside the United
States. We use the census{provided edurec variable to identify college graduates (16 years
of education or more in the 1950{1980 censuses, and a college or higher degree in the 1990
and 2000 censuses) and high{school dropouts (11 or fewer years of education). People
with post{college education are people with 17 or more years of education in the 1950{
1980 censuses, and a post{college degree in 1990 and 2000. This is the highest level of
education that can be distinguished for the whole 1950{2000 period. We use the 1940
census to compute lagged instruments. Alaska and Hawaii are not in the 1940 and 1950
IPUMS. The SIC codes we count as electrical engineering are 321, 322, 342, 350, 371, 372.
B.4 Other data
We use Bureau of Economic Analysis data for total state population (used to weight the
regressions) and for state personal income per capita (available from 1929 onwards, unlike
gross state product which is not available for my whole period). The data are available
at www.bea.gov/regional/spi/.
Department of Defense procurement contracts by state are available on paper for the
early years in Prime Contract Awards by State, Fiscal Years 1951{1978, published by the
Department of Defense, OASD (Comptroller), Directorate for Information Operations
and Control. The later years are available online at www.fpds.gov. Some measurement
error in the attribution to states is involved, as recipient rms may subcontract the work
to rms in other states. Also, in the electronic records for 1978{1983, 1986 and 1989 (of
which only 1980 is relevant for the paper), the California numbers seem to be too small by
a factor of 1000, so we have multiplied them by 1000. (We have obtained scanned versions
of the paper documents for these years: the values for the non{problematic states and
years are only approximately the same as those online, but the problematic California
31years are indeed about 1000 times higher than the online version.)
We obtain the land area of each state from the US. Census Bureau at
www.census.gov/population/censusdata/90den stco.txt.
32Table 1: Patenting by immigrant status 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  College graduates  Post-college graduates  Scientists and 
engineers 
  Immigrant  Native  Immigrant  Native  Immigrant  Native 
Any patent granted  0.018  0.009  0.034  0.013  0.061  0.049 
Number patents 
granted 
0.054  0.028  0.108  0.036  0.174  0.132 
Any patent 
commercialized 
0.011  0.006  0.020  0.008  0.036  0.030 
Number patents 
commercialized 
0.027  0.017  0.052  0.019  0.082  0.074 
Share immigrant  0.144  0.166  0.245 
Observations  21,248  71,304  12,042  30,460  6840  15,519 
 
Notes: Shares weighted with survey weights. Patents questions only asked of respondents who had 
ever worked. Whether a patent has been granted refers to period from October 1998 to the survey 
in 2003, and whether a patent has been commercialized or licensed refers to those patents granted in 
the same period.  
 
Source: 2003 National Survey of College Graduates. Table 2: Means of aggregate patents and aggregate variables affecting patenting 
 
  1950-2000  1950  2000 






Share of population 18-65 that is:       
     Immigrant, college education and above  0.016  0.004  0.035 
     Native, college education and above  0.136  0.062  0.200 
     Immigrant, post-college education  0.008  0.002  0.016 
     Native, post-college education  0.054  0.023  0.077 
Share of workers 18-65 that are:       
     Immigrant, scientists and engineers  0.004  0.001  0.009 
     Native, scientists and engineers  0.024  0.012  0.035 












DoD prime military procurement contracts 



















Observations  304  49  51 
 
Notes: Means of state-level variables, weighted by state population the year after the census. Patents 
and population are led by one year. Census information is not available for Alaska and Hawaii in 
1950. Patents are classified by year filed. 
 
Sources:  
Education,  age,  occupation,  nativity:  U.S.  Census  Bureau,  IPUMS  decennial  census  microdata 
usa.ipums.org/usa/ 
Patents: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, electronic and paper data. 
State income, population: Bureau of Economic Analysis www.bea.gov/regional/spi/ 
Land Area: U.S. Census Bureau www.census.gov/population/censusdata/90den_stco.txt 
 Table 3: Patenting by field of study and field of study by immigrant status, college graduates 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 








Computer science, math  0.017  0.012  0.076  0.036 
Biological, agricultural and 
environment sciences 
0.023  0.011  0.056  0.040 
Physical sciences  0.066  0.038  0.035  0.017 
Social and related sciences  0.004  0.002  0.091  0.108 
Engineering  0.060  0.042  0.132  0.053 
Other S&E (mainly health)  0.007  0.004  0.164  0.121 
Non-S&E  0.004  0.002  0.446  0.624 
All fields  0.011  0.007  1.00  1.00 
 
Notes: Shares weighted by survey weights. “S&E” means science and engineering. Full sample (i.e. 
college graduates), 92,552 observations. Whether a patent has been granted refers to period from 
October 1998 to the survey in 2003, and whether a patent has been commercialized or licensed 
refers to those patents granted in the same period. 
 
Source: 2003 National Survey of College Graduates. 
 
 Table 4: Effect of immigrant status on patenting 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Any patent granted?  Any patent 
commercialized? 












     Pseudo-R















     Pseudo-R















     Pseudo-R
2  0.00  0.08  0.12  0.13  0.00  0.09 
Major field of 
highest degree 
--  Y  Y  Y  --  Y 
Highest degree  --  --  Y  Y  --  Y 
Age, age2, sex, 
employed 
--  --  --  Y  --  -- 
 
Notes:  Marginal  effect  on  dummy  for  foreign-born  from  weighted  probits.    There  are  92,552 
observations in the college graduate sample, 42,502 in the post-college sample and 22,359 in the 
scientist and engineer sample. All scientists and engineers are employed in the reference week. Post-
college degrees include master’s (including MBA), PhD and professional. There are 30 major field of 
study dummies (we combine the two S&E teacher training categories into one). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
  Table 5: Crowd-out - effect of change in immigrant skilled share on change in total skilled share  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Basic specification  Control for less skilled immigration 
Difference:  10 year  30 year  50 year  10 year  30 year  50 year 
Panel A: Immigrant college+ as share of population       


















R-squared  0.69  0.52  0.33  0.72  0.63  0.50 
Panel B: Immigrant post-college as share of population       


















R-squared  0.80  0.38  0.58  0.84  0.60  0.75 
Panel C: Immigrant scientists and engineers as share of workers     


















R-squared  0.74  0.42  0.45  0.74  0.46  0.48 
Observations  253  151  49  253  151  49 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the share of skilled people across periods ranging 
from ten to 50 years: in panel A skilled people are college graduates (as a share of the population), in 
panel B post-college educated (as a share of the population), in panel C scientists and engineers (as a 
share of workers). Regressions are weighted with weights 1/(1/popt+1/popt-k), where k is equal to 
10 in columns 1 and 4, 30 in columns 2 and 5, and 50 in columns 3 and 6. All regressions also 
include change in average age and (except columns 3 and 6) year dummies. Regressions in columns 
4-6 include the change in the share of immigrants with high school education or less as a share of 
the population. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. P-value of the test that the 
coefficient is equal to one is in square brackets. Table 6: Effect of share of immigrant college graduates on patents per capita 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Δ Log patents per capita  Δ Patents per capita 
  Weighted least squares  IV  Weighted LS  IV 
Difference:  10 year  30 year  50 year  10 year  10 year  50 year  10 year 
Δ % Immigrant college+ 

















Δ % Native college+  









































































State personal income 















R-squared  0.64  0.57  0.57  --  0.47  0.34  -- 
Observations  253  151  49  253  253  49  253 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference in (log) patents per capita across periods ranging 
from ten to 50 years, with a lead of one year compared to the independent variables. Weighted least 
squares  (columns  1-3,  5-6)  or  instrumental  variables  (columns  4  and  7)  with  weights 
1/(1/popt+1+1/popt-k+1), where k the length of the difference. Regressions in columns 1,2,4, 5 and 7 
include year dummies. The instrumented variable is the change in the share of immigrant college 
graduates;  the  instruments  are  three  variables  for  the  share  of  high  school  dropouts  in  the 
population at time t-10 from Europe, China and India. F-statistic for test of joint significance of 
excluded  instruments  in  the  first  stage  in  brackets.  Standard  errors  clustered  by  state  are  in 
parentheses. Coefficients in columns 5-7 are multiplied by 100. 
 Table 7: Effect of immigrant post-college and scientist and engineer shares on patents per capita 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Δ Log patents per capita  Δ Patents per capita 
  Weighted least squares  IV  Weighted LS  IV 
Difference:  10 year  30 year  50 year  10 year  10 year  50 year  10 year 
Panel A: Immigrant post-college as share of population 






























R-squared  0.63  0.52  0.52  --  0.46  0.29  -- 
Panel B: Immigrant scientists and engineers as share of workers 






























R-squared  0.68  0.59  0.67  --  0.55  0.48  -- 
Observations  253  151  49  253  253  49  253 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference in (log) patents per capita across periods ranging 
from ten to 50 years, with a lead of one year compared to the independent variables. Weighted least 
squares  (columns  1-3,  5-6)  or  instrumental  variables  (columns  4  and  7)  with  weights 
1/(1/popt+1+1/popt-k+1),  where  k  is  equal  to  the  difference  length.  All  regressions  include  the 
covariates of Table 6. The instrumented variable is the change in the share of skilled immigrants; the 
instruments are three variables for the share of high school dropouts in the population at time t-10 
from Europe, China and India. F-statistic for test of joint significance of excluded instruments in the 
first stage in brackets. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Coefficients in columns 
4-6 are multiplied by 100. 
 Table 8: Effect of skilled immigration on patents per capita - specification checks 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Δ Log patents per capita, 10-year differences 
Skilled group:  College graduates  Scientists and engineers 
Δ % Immigrant  WLS  IV  WLS  IV 












2. Instrument is % population which is 
European, Chinese, Indian-born high 
school dropouts at t-20 
--  23.1 
(8.4) 
[10] 
--  56.5 
(23.8) 
[10] 
3. Instrument is % population which is 
foreign-born high school dropout at t-10, 
and its square 
--  10.4 
(6.2) 
[28] 
--  58.8 
(22.7) 
[15] 
4. Instrument is % population which is 
foreign-born high school dropout at t-20, 
and its square 
--  10.6 
(7.9) 
[17] 
--  60.5 
(30.7) 
[5] 












6. Covariates include % workers in 




































Notes: Each coefficient reported is the effect of a change in skilled immigrant share from a different 
regression. The dependent variable is the difference in (log) patents across ten years, with a lead of 
one year  compared to the  independent  variables. Weighted  least  squares  (columns  1  and  3)  or 
instrumental variables (columns 2 and 4) with weights 1/(1/popt+1+1/popt-9). The instruments are 
three variables for the share of high school dropouts in the population at time t-10 from Europe, 
China  and India  unless  otherwise  specified.  F-statistic  for  test  of  joint  significance  of excluded 
instruments in the first stage in brackets. All regressions also include the covariates of Table 6 
including the appropriate differenced share of skilled natives. Standard errors clustered by state are 
in parentheses. 253 observations unless otherwise noted.  Table 9: Effect of skilled immigration on patent citations per capita and patents by type 1970-2000 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Δ Log patents per capita, instrumental variables 
Skilled group:  College graduates  Post-college  Scientists/engineers 
Difference:  10 year  20 year  10 year  20 year  10 year  20 year 












2. Patent citations  













3. Computer and  













4. Electrical and  













5. Drug and medical 

















































First stage F-statistic for 
excluded instruments 
7  9  10  7  6  8 
Observations  
(rows 1,2,7,8) 
153  102  153  102  153  102 
 
Notes: Each coefficient reported is the effect of a change in skilled immigrant share from a different 
regression. The dependent variable is the difference in log patents per capita across ten or twenty 
years, or log of patent citations per capita, with a lead of one year compared to the independent 
variables.  Weighted  instrumental  variables  for  1970-2000  with  weights  1/(1/popt+1+1/popt-k+1), 
where k the length of the difference. All regressions include the share of employment in electrical 
sectors in 1980 interacted with year dummies and the other covariates included in Table 6. The 
instrumented variable is the change in the share of skilled immigrants; the instruments are three 
variables for the share of high school dropouts in the population at time t-10 from Europe, China 
and India. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Observations for ten and twenty 
year differences are 141 and 95 for computer patents, 149 and 99 for electrical patents, 150 and 99 
for drug patents, and 150 and 100 for chemical patents.  Appendix Table 1: Means of individual-level variables 
 
  College graduates  Post-college  Scientists/engineers 
  Immigrant  Native  Immigrant  Native  Immigrant  Native 
Highest degree:             
   Bachelor’s  0.58  0.65  --  --  0.44  0.68 
   Master’s  0.28  0.26  0.66  0.74  0.39  0.26 
   Doctorate  0.07  0.03  0.17  0.08  0.16  0.06 
   Professional  0.07  0.06  0.17  0.17  0.01  0.01 
Field of highest degree           
   Computer  
   science, math 
0.076  0.036  0.091  0.027  0.219  0.168 
   Biological, agri- 
   cultural, environ- 
   ment science 
0.056  0.040  0.061  0.030  0.092  0.093 
   Physical science  0.035  0.017  0.044  0.017  0.077  0.072 
   Social science  0.091  0.108  0.069  0.078  0.026  0.046 
   Engineering  0.132  0.053  0.131  0.037  0.397  0.321 
   Other S&E   0.164  0.121  0.199  0.157  0.069  0.058 
   Non-S&E  0.446  0.624  0.406  0.653  0.120  0.243 
Sex (female)  0.48  0.50  0.43  0.49  0.24  0.23 












Employed  0.86  0.85  0.89  0.87  1.00  1.00 
Observations  21,248  71,304  12,042  30,460  6840  15,519 
 
Notes: Means weighted with survey weights. S&E means science and engineering. “Other S&E” 
includes the social sciences. 
 
Source: National Survey of College Graduates Appendix Table 2: Means of aggregate instruments for change in skilled immigrant share 
 
  1950-2000  1950  2000 
Share of population 18-65 that is:       
     Immigrant, high school dropouts  0.041  0.066  0.046 
Share of population 18+ that is:       
     European-born, high school dropouts  0.023  0.067  0.004 
     Chinese-born, high school dropouts  0.0008  0.0006  0.0013 
     Indian-born, high school dropouts  0.0002  0.0000  0.0006 
Observations  304  49  51 
 
Notes:  Means  of  state-level  variables,  weighted  by  state  population.  Census  information  is  not 
available for Alaska and Hawaii in 1950.  
 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Convergence in Patenting Across States 1929-2001